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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN SEARCH WARRANT
AFFIDA.-VITS
Within the past few years, several federal appel-
late courts I have addressed the question whether an
attack upon a search warrant affidavit can be made,
alleging not that it was facially insufficient to sup-
ply probable cause, 2 but that when made it was
actually false or fraudulent, or both.' The circuits
are presently applying different standards to this
issue, creating confusion and inconsistency in the
federal courts. To compound this problem, the
courts have seen fit to delineate two categories of
variables relevant to the question. The first is
whether the misstatement in the affidavit is ma-
terial or immaterial to the establishment of probable
cause. The second category might be termed the de-
gree of culpability on the part of the affiant. Thus
'The Supreme Court has not yet passed on the extent to
which a court may permit an examination with respect to
the validity of a warrant facially valid, and when the
allegations of the underlying affidavits establish probable
cause. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32
(1964).
2It is well established that a defendant may challenge
the sufficiency of the affidavit's allegations by examining the
affidavit on its face. See United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965).
It is also well established that a defendant may challenge
the credibility and reliability of an informant whose
information is utilized by a peace officer seeking a search
warrant. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). According to these
cases, the reliability of confidential informants is to be
evaluated on a two-pronged test which requires that the
affiant have sufficient information to establish (1) the
reliability of the informant, and (2) the conclusion that a
crime has been committed. Thus, under this test the
defendant may challenge affignt's statement that an inform-
ant reported criminal activity by the defendant, but may not
contest the truth of hearsay evidence reported in good faith
by the affiant. Cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
(1971).
3The federal appellate courts have only dealt with the
veracity of government affiants, not nongovernment affi-
ants. See United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir.
1974).
Numerous legal commentators have also discussed this
question. See, e.g., Kipperman, Inaccurate Search War-
rant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppression, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 825 (1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of
Affidavits for Search Warrants; Piercing the Presumption
of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970); Note, Testing the
Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 CoLui L. REV. 15
(1967).
far, the courts have discussed five possible degrees
of culpability. The misstatement might be made:
innocently, negligently, recklessly, intentionally, or
with the specific intent to deceive the court. There-
fore, there are a total of ten circumstances for which
judicial guidelines might be indicated.
The Sixth Circuit is the latest of the federal courts
to examine this question and has added its own
definition of the legal standards to be applied in this
type of situation. 4 In United States v. Luna the
government appealed from the suppression of wire-
tap evidence in its prosecution of Luna and three
other defendants. I In the suppression opinion, the
district judge identified as false one sentence of a
fifteen-page affidavit filed by an FBI agent. The
sentence pertained to information concerning thefts
at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport and the subse-
quent fencing of the stolen materials. The statement
in question alleged that Luna was providing means
of payment to men actually performing the thefts. 6
At the suppression hearing the informant denied
unequivocally that such statement in the agent's
4 United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975).
The Sixth Circuit has previously dealt with unintentional
error in affidavits. In United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d
236, 241-42 (1965) the court said:
While we have noted that the intent to deceive
the magistrate charge was never presented to the
District Judge, he did have clearly before him the
factual errors in the affidavits upon which appellant
now relies. Under this circumstance, we read the
denial of the motion to suppress evidence as a holding
that there was probable cause for the warrant and that
errors in the affidavit were either immaterial or
unintentional. .
However, the court refused to allow expression on the
controversy on the basis that the factual situation presented
in that case did not lend itself properly to the issue. Id. at
242 n.2.
5The four had been indicted on four counts charging
conspiracy to extort money. After originally denying defense
motions to suppress the evidence, the district judge
subsequently took testimony on a supplemental motion to
suppress and thereafter granted that motion in a bench
opinion.
6The statement was as follows:
FBI-1 told me that Hines told him that Joseph
"Joe" Tocco and Gilbert Luna provide the means of
payment to the men actually performing the thefts
and receive money from the sales of the freight and
merchandise stolen, as well as some of the stolen
freight and merchandise.
United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 5-6 (6th Cir. 1975).
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affidavit was ever made and the court concluded that
it was false. 7
According to the Sixth Circuit, there are two
circumstances wherein an affidavit may be im-
peached even though it is facially sufficient for the
establishment of probable cause. The first consists
of the knowing use of a false statement by the affiant
with intent to deceive the court. The court noted that
such perjury must lead to suppression of the evi-
dence in order to prevent fraud upon the judicial
process.' The second circumstance arises when a
law enforcement agent recklessly asserts a state-
ment essential to establishment of probable cause
which is false. ' The court stated the test necessary
in showing recklessness. The movant must offer
affidavits showing (1) that the statement sought to
be attacked was false when made, and (2) that
when made the affiant did not have reasonable
grounds for believing it. 1 The court felt that in
the future, it will be important for the hearing
judge to "determine whether means had been avail-
able to the agent to establish the truth or falsity of
the statement without such delay as would defeat
a legitimate enforcement purpose." "
7United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975).
The reason the court found the statement false was that
there was no evidence presented in the hearing to contradict
the informant's denial.
The district judge found the statement not only false but
also material and held that any material false statement in
the affidavit required suppression of the evidence seized
under the intercept order. He declined to find that the falsity
was an intentional effort to deceive the court, but concluded
that the misrepresentation was knowing and not inadvert-
ent. After a motion for rehearing was denied, the govern-
ment appealed, claiming that the case should be remanded
for further testimony and for a square resolution of the credi-
bility of the witnesses. Although the appellate court agreed
with the desirability of remand for resolution of credibility,
it felt compelled to define the legal standards applicable in a
situation of this type.
'United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975).
'Id. at 8.
'Old.
Id. The court stated that if the agents were allowed to
freely employ false allegations in order to secure warrants,
the result would be a mockery of the magistrate's role.
Unfortunately, however, it gave no indication as to how the
hearing judge might measure the means available to the
affiant to establish the truth or falsity of his statements. In
addition, the court gave no suggestions as to how the
hearing judge might effectively establish the criteria neces-
sary to resolve the question as to whether a legitimate
enforcement purpose was defeated by an undue delay. The
length of "delay," "means available" and "legitimate
enforcement purposes" are all ambiguous terms which need
defining in order to make the Sixth Circuit's statement
meaningful.
More importantly, this power given to the district judge
The Sixth Circuit was concerned with the issue of
good faith. It noted that while intentional falsifica-
tion or utter recklessness as to truth or falsity would
be a lack of good faith in the performance of the
agent's duty to the judicial officer, a good faith error
should not be held to require suppression of evidence
even where the erroneous allegation was essential to
establishment of probable cause. The court made a
special distinction between perjury and human error.
However, the court appears to waver regarding its
notion of the importance of good faith. On one hand it
states that utter recklessness as to truth or falsity of
allegations to affidavits shows lack of good faith, but
on the other hand, this lack of good faith will only
affect suppression of evidence if the statement is false
when made. Thus, a reckless statement that coinci-
dentally proves true will be allowed to admit evi-
dence at the trial. Although the court attempts to
promote careful police work, it is conceivable that
governmental agents might risk reckless statements
knowing that the evidence will be admissible if the
allegations ultimately turn out to be true. 1
The standards set out by the Sixth Circuit appear
less favorable to the defense than the standards for-
mulated by any of the other circuits thus far. In
United States v. Carmichael's the affidavit alleged
that an informant whose information had led to six
prior convictions had stated that defendant and
others had items stolen from mails in their posses-
sion. The affidavit described one particular check
and stated that one party advised informant that
the checks would be cashed by the defendants. The
trial judge refused to allow defense counsel to elicit
evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress
that would cast doubt on the reliability of the in-
formant. 11 The Seventh Circuit held that the affi-
seems as if the Sixth Circuit is carving out a significant
exception to its holding. It is not clear whether the lan-
guage used in the holding is inconsistent or whether the
court, in fact, wished to allow situations where an agent
knowingly makes false or reckless statements in his affi-
davit because it was his opinion that otherwise a legitimate
law enforcement purpose would be defeated.
"Note also that the evidence would not be suppressed if
the statements in the affidavit were recklessly made but
immaterial to establishing probable cause. This should hold
true even for those statements recklessly made in bad faith.
13489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). Accord,
United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1974).
"The defense counsel made the following offer of
proof:
If the witness [agent] were allowed to answer my
questions with respect to the reliable informant, his
answers would show that no information had been
given [by informant] at any previous time that led to
the arrest or conviction of anybody; that he [inform-
[Vol. 67
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davit was sufficient to show probable cause to sup-
port an arrest warrant. 5 However, the court also
held that a defendant was entitled to a hearing
which delves below the surface of the facially suffi-
cient affidavit if he has made an initial showing
of either of the following: (1) any misrepresentation
by the government agent of a material fact, or (2) an
intentional misrepresentation by the government
agent, whether or not material. 16 But, once such a
hearing is granted, the Seventh Circuit established a
test more rigorous than the hearing prerequisites in
order for evidence to be suppressed. They noted that
evidence should not be suppressed unless the trial
court finds that the government agent was recklessly
or intentionally untruthful. 17 A completely innocent
ant] had prior criminal arrests and criminal con-
victions, and that there was no basis for his [agent's]
concluding or for this court to conclude that the
allegedly reliable informant was a reliable informant.
United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 987 (7th Cir.
1973) (en banc). The state objected to this offer of proof,
which resulted in a ruling in its favor.
I5The court felt that the agent had adequately spelled
out the informant's reliability in the affidavit. The court
also felt that it was immaterial that the concluding portion
of the affidavit contained hearsay,
namely, the statement of the second informant, i.e.,
the possessor of the checks, to the first informant that
the checks would be given by defendant Carmichael to
John Doe ... and then to [informant]; that they were
stolen from the mail; and that Carmichael and Doe
would cash or cause them to be cashed. The statement
by the second informant was an admission against
penal interest, thus manifesting his reliability and
constituting an exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 986.
Although the Carmichael case deals with an affidavit for
an arrest warrant instead of a search warrant, the standards
for the veracity of the affidavit should be similar, if not the
same.
"Id. at 988. In United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d
318, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1960) the Seventh Circuit expressed
its opinion in dicta that the propriety of such a hearing is
"hardly open to question." See United States v. Roth, 391
F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967). In United States v. Edge,
444 F.2d 1372, 1375-76 n.8 (7th Cir. 1971) the court
recognized "the difficulties inherent in deciding when and
how far to permit attack upon the truthfulness of affidavits
submitted to magistrates" and formerly to commissioners.
In Pearce and Roth, the hearings were actually allowed in
the trial courts, so that there was no need for the court to
decide whether a defendant could insist on such a hearing;
and in Edge the question before the court in Carmichael
was left open.
In the Carmichael case, the court held that the defense
counsel's offer of proof along with information about the
informant's possible unreliability that was brought out by
defense counsel at trial was enough to fulfill the threshold
requirements for a hearing.
"7 The Seventh Circuit felt that the two-pronged test of
misrepresentation would not be sufficient for sup-
pression of evidence, regardless of whether it was
material or immaterial for probable cause. The
reasoning for this parallels the Sixth Circuit in that
the court felt that the primary justification for the
exclusionary rule 16 is to deter police misconduct and
good faith errors cannot be deterred."
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Carmichael court stated
that in situations where the officer is reckless, if the
misrepresentation is immaterial,"0 it does not affect
the issuance of the warrant and thus there is no
justification for suppressing the evidence. However,
the Seventh Circuit gave no guidelines as to establish-
ing recklessness on the part of the affiant, as did the
Sixth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit did address itself
to the question of negligent misrepresentations.
While they felt that negligent misstatements are the-
oretically deterrable, the court felt that there was no
workable test for determining whether an officer
was negligent or completely innocent in not checking
his facts further. 21 The Sixth Circuit made no refer-
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) sufficiently tests
the credibility of confidential informers. Therefore, they
held that defendant may not challenge the truth of hearsay
evidence reported by an affiant. The court would allow
defendant, however, to challenge, after a proper showing,
any statements based on the affiant's personal
knowledge, including his representations concerning
the informer's reliability, his representation that the
hearsay statements were actually made, and his
implied representation that he believes the hearsay to
be true.
United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir.
1973). They concluded that this decision would fill the gap
not covered by the Aguilar tests.
"Although the Seventh Circuit asserted that its ruling
was not based on constitutional grounds, its analysis was
based on the prophylactic value of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule.
"9 The court went on and stated:
Furthermore, such errors do not negate prob-
able cause. If an agent reasonably believes facts
which on their face indicate that a crime has probably
been committed, then even if mistaken, he has
probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed. Such errors are likelier and more tolerable
during the early stages of the criminal process, for
issuance of a warrant is not equivalent to conviction.
United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988-89 (7th
Cir. 1973) (en bane).20The Sixth Circuit phrased it "essential to establish-
ment of probable cause." United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d
4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 1 Interestingly, the implication is that there is a work-
able test for determining recklessness, although the court
never mentioned what this test might be.
As the Second Circuit pointed out in United States v.
Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1973), the Carmichael
holding is very similar to a rule proposed by Professor Kip-
19761
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ence to negligent misstatements whatsoever, leaving
this question open.
In the same year that the Carmichael case was
decided, the Fifth Circuit looked at the identical
issue and came up with a different approach. In
United States z,. Thomas2 2 the affidavit stated that
according to two reliable informants, a "James
Finley" was a heroin trafficker and was supplying
numerous southern cities. "Finley" currently had a
supply of heroin in his possession and would supply
one informant with as much of the narcotic as
desired. In addition, the affidavit stated that "Fin-
ley" was driving a 1971 Lincoln bearing Alabama
license number 2A15335. At the suppression hearing
the affiant admitted that the informants did not
designate the party discussed by the name of "James
H. Finley." but consistently referred to him as
"Tee" during each conversation with the agent. It
was the agent's own testimony that it was he, not the
informants as stated in the affidavit, who ascribed the
name "Finley" to the party discussed by the infor-
mants. The agent stated that he based this conclusion
on certain deductions made after additional inves-
tigation. The agent discovered through the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Office in Alabama
that the 1971 Lincoln had been associated with
heroin traffic. He also discovered that the car was
registered to "James H. Finley." Thus, the agent
deduced that "Tee" was "Finley" and used this
name in the affidavit. The agent did not learn that
the man arrested was the defendant Thomas who
was the person known as "Tee" until after the ar-
rest.
The Fifth Circuit discarded the standard where-
upon the affidavit would be valid if probable cause
can still be established after the deletion of the mis-
statements.2" They held instead that affidavits
containing misrepresentations are invalid if the
error (1) was committed with an intent to deceive
the magistrate, whether or not the error is material
to the showing of probable cause, or (2) made non-
intentionally, but the erroneous statement is ma-
terial to the establishment of probable cause for
perman. See note 3 supra. Unlike the Seventh Circuit,
however, Kipperman would void a warrant based on an
affidavit containing negligent material misstatements.
22489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973).
"The court had previously determined that after delet-
ing erroneous statements, if the affidavits then totally lacked
facts tending to show the requisite probable cause, the
search warrants pursuant thereto were invalid. United
States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971).
the search. 24 In the Thomas case the court held that
the agent's erroneous theory of "Tee's" real identity
was immaterial to the establishment of probable
cause. They also found the error to be "blantantly
misrepresentative." 25 However, due to the license
plate registration and his knowledge that both
"Tee" and "Finley" were from Alabama, this
evidence was enough for affiant to validly assume
that "Tee" was "Finley." The court admitted that
the issue was difficult, but felt compelled to affirm
the district court's finding that the agent's error was
made in good faith and not with an intent to deceive
the magistrate.
The Sixth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit will
therefore invalidate affidavits containing intentional
mispresentations intending to deceive the court or
magistrate . 26 Unlike these circuits, the Seventh
Circuit finds that any intentional misrepresenta-
tion by the affiant will invalidate the affidavit.
Whereas it appears as if the standards are stricter
in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, these courts have
not indicated how intentional.deception of a court
could be proven. Also, it seems inherent in an in-
tentional misrepresentation that the affiant intends
to misrepresent facts to the court wherein he hopes
to obtain a warrant. 27
"4United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir.
1973).25 ld. at 671.
"6See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
"Apparently the agent (affiant) in the Sixth Circuit case
swore to a material fact which the informant never stated.
See note 7 and accompanying text supra. In the Thomas
case the agent (affiant) concluded that a nickname given by
the informants was the same as a name he found through
independent investigation. He then stated in his affidavit
that the informants used this second name.
The court in the Sixth Circuit case found that the
misrepresentation was knowing, but that it was not an
intentional effort to deceive the court. The Fifth Circuit in
Thomas found the error to be "blatantly misrepresenta-
tive." Considering the fact that an affiant's statements are
under oath, how is it possible to have a knowing or
"blatant" misrepresentation without specific intent to de-
ceive the court? The Fifth Circuit seems to allude to this
paradox, although it doesn't adequately deal with the issue,
when it stated:
For the purpose of this opinion we use the word
"intentional" as meaning "with intent to deceive
the magistrate." Of course, Phillips intended to use
the name "Finley." In that sense, his incorrect
statement was intentional.
United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 665 n.1 (5th Cir.
1973).
Perhaps the misrepresentations in these cases are better
termed negligence. The Sixth Circuit case as discussed by
the court does not appear to have facts which would in any
way distinguish between a knowing misrepresentation and
[Vol. 67
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The Fifth Circuit, in the second situation noted,
distinguished between nonintentional error that was
material or immaterial to the establishment of
probable cause. The Fifth Circuit stated that mate-
rial errors in this nonintentional circumstance
would invalidate the affidavit whereas an immaterial
error would not. In apparent contradiction to this
definite statement the Thomas court went on and
determined that the "blatant" misrepresentation
in the affidavit in its case was neither intentional nor
material to the showing of probable cause, thereby
not reaching the question of what degrees of non
intentional misrepresentation, i.e., reckless, negli-
gent or innocent are necessary to ihvalidate an affi-
davit. 28 Thus, it is conceivable that the Fifth Cir-
cuit might in a later case decide that only reckless
or negligent misrepresentations material to prob-
able cause would invalidate the affidavit, but com-
pletely innocent falsifications, material or not,
would never be sufficient. However, as the opinion
reads now, this omission leaves the standards for
invalidation of affidavits unclear in a wide variety
of factual situations. The Seventh Circuit held that
a completely innocent misrepresentation would
never be sufficient to suppress evidence regardless
of its materiality, agreeing with the Sixth Circuit
that a good faith error would not require suppression
of evidence even where the erroneous allegation was
essential to the establishment of probable cause.
In United States v. Marihart, 9 the Eighth Circuit
looked at the standards created by both the Seventh
and Fifth Circuits, and adopted the Seventh Circuit's
requirements. 30 However, that court specifically left
an intent to deceive the court. On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit's facts may be better termed a negligent misrep-
resentation rather than a knowing misrepresentation. See
text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.281d. at 671 n.5.
29492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974). The case involved the
illegal possession of firearms by previously convicted felons.
The defendants claimed, on appeal, certain inaccuracies in
the government agent's affidavit and testimony allegedly
established by other officers pursuant to defendant's
renewed motion to suppress. The court held that the in-
accuracies were immaterial and that no absence of good
faith had been shown. Therefore, the affidavit and subse-
quent search warrant were valid.
"0The court in Marihart stated:
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that completely
innocent misrepresentation should not support sup-
pression even if material. The primaryjustification for
the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.
Furthermore, if the officer reasonably believes facts
which facially indicate a crime has been committed,
then even if mistaken, he has probable cause for
believing a crime has been committed.
Id. at 900 n.4.
undecided the issue as to what initial showing must
be made to obtain a hearing.
The First Circuit has also faced this issue of
veracity in affidavits in United States v. Belcufine, 3
but chose neither the Seventh nor the Fifth Circuit's
standards. That case involved the possession and
mailing of a pipe bomb which exploded in a Postal
Annex. The package which carried the bomb was
addressed to the Worcester Music Co., the defend-
ant's former employer. From information given by
officials of the music company 2 and a report from
the Postal Service Crime Laboratory which identi-
fied defendant's thumb print on the inner wrapping
of the parcel containing the bomb, the postal inspec-
tors secured from a magistrate a warrant to search
the premises of the music company which presently
employed defendant. The affidavit in support of the
search warrant stated that the premises of the latter
music company consisted of a front office with one
desk and file cabinets. It also stated that to the rear
of this office through a door partially open, the
inspectors observed a wooden bench and table. The
defendant contended on appeal that the fruits of the
search should have been suppressed, because the
postal inspectors' allegation of observing a wooden
bench and table in the music establishment was false,
that evidence presented at the suppression hearing
made it apparent that they could not have seen what
they said they saw, and that they admitted as much
in their testimony.
Although the Belcufine court found the misre-
presentation non-material,33 it remanded the case for
a hearing to decide whether the postal inspectors
knowingly misrepresented the facts. The court con-
sidered what initial showing must be made to obtain
a hearing to suppress and decided it appropriate
when a defendant makes a preliminary showing of
knowing misstatements in the affidavit. However, the
court did not. address the question of a preliminary
showing of non-intentional misstatements as being
suitable for a hearing to suppress. In fact, the court
31 508 F.2d 58 (lst Cir. 1974).
32 Officials of Worcester Music Co. told postal inspec-
tors that defendant had been employed by Worcester as a
service manager; that he had knowledge of electrical
circuitry and soldering; that defendant and another were
the proprietors of Bell Music and Amusement Co., against
which Worcester had obtained an $80,000 judgment for
breach of a covenant not to compete; and that Bell Music
would be apt to have a workshop equipped to do electrical
soldering.
,",Excising that paragraph of the affidavit, however, we
still find at least the minimal requirements for probable
cause satisfied." United States v. Belcufine, 508 F.2d 58,
62 (1st Cir. 1974).
19761
did not consider innocent misstatements at all and
specifically refused to indicate any views on negligent
but material misstatements.3 4 What the court did
consider was intentional but immaterial misstate-
ments. The significance of this case lies in its
definition of material, which differs somewhat from
the other circuits in that material was defined as "but
for essential of probable cause." 3 5 The court said that
it adopted this phrasing from the Seventh Circuit.3 6
However, the Seventh Circuit spoke of a "material
fact." 37 The Thomas court used "material to the
establishment of probable cause," 3 while the Sixth
Circuit most closely resembles the First Circuit's
definition of materiality when it suggested "a state-
ment essential to establishment for probable
cause."39
Although the Seventh, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits all
consider the probable cause factor in affidavits, the
First Circuit seemed to recognize that marginally
adequate affidavits are not always acceptable and
that an immaterial statement not essential for proba-
ble cause might still have an impact on a mar-
ginally adequate affidavit. Thus, in the Belcufine
case, although the court found the statement that the
inspectors had observed a wooden bench and table in
the rear of the music building to be false, the court
also found it to be immaterial for probable cause.
However, the court also asserted that the fact alleged
in the affidavit that the agents had actually seen a
workbench within the music premises may have
carried great weight with the magistrate, for it both
provided an independent fact supporting a finding of
probable cause, and verified by observation the
educated guess given by the Worcester Music
officials, thus strengthening the credibility of all they
said. Therefore, the statement changed a marginally
3 4We find perplexing the question of the prophylac-
tic value of the exclusion of evidence secured with a
warrant issued in reliance on negligent and material,
but not intentional misstatements. At this stage of
development of legal doctrine, we would hesitate to
adopt a position for this circuit on a hypothetical
basis. Suffice it to say that, as we view the record,
the question is not before us, and we imply no views
as to the answer.
Id. at 61-62.
Interestingly, the Belcufine court distinguished the
Fifth and Seventh Circuit's consequences for negligent
misstatements.
3sUnited States v. Belcufine, 508 F.2d 58, 62 (lst Cir.
1974).
361d. at 61 n.3.
17United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th
Cir. 1973).
3 United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir.
1973).
39 United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8 6th Cir. (1975).
adequate affidavit into a solidly persuasive one."
Although the statement was nonmaterial, but still
relevant and nontrivial, the court remanded the case
for a hearing on the question whether the postal
inspectors knowingly misrepresented the facts.
Although the First Circuit specifically rejected the
equation of "material" to "relevant to an element of
probable cause,"'" its ruling requires it to make the
analysis such a definition would necessitate.
The First Circuit considered the question of
immaterial but intentional false statements in affida-
vits. All of the other circuits considered agree that
suppression is necessary, even if the statement is im-
material. 42 Although never specifically stating its
position on this issue, the First Circuit did hold that
suppression of evidence must be allowed when the
warrant vas based on an affidavit containing an
intentional, relevant, and nontrivial misstatement,
even though immaterial for probable cause. The Bel-
cufine court also disputed the necessity for specific
intent to deceive the court and would allow suppres-
sion of the evidence if the intentional, relevant and
nontrivial misstatement merely intended to "round
out the picture." 4 " The implication from this hold-
ing is that immaterial, albeit intentional misstate-
ments, which are irrelevant or trivial would not
invalidate the affidavit. This is a clear departure
from the other circuits who have unanimously held
that intentional misstatements, material or not,
regardless of impact, must be suppressed on the
basis of policy.
The Second Circuit did not set any standards
useful to the determination of the veracity of affida-
vits. United States v. Gonzalez4 4 distinguished
between two different tests governing the standards
"'The court felt that a "knowing misstatement of so
significant a fact would exhibit exactly that quality of
unscrupled zeal which impelled the adoption of the exclu-
sionary rule." United States v. Belcufine, 508 F.2d 58, 62
(lst Cir. 1974).
4 Id. at 61 n.3.
"The definition of intentional misrepresentation for the
various circuit courts is subject to the caveats raised in notes
26-28 and accompanying text supra.
3 Id. at 62. Unfortunately the court did not specifically
explain the term "round out the picture" nor give guide-
lines as to its meaning. Since the court was contrasting this
phrase to intentionally deceiving the court, it might be
assumed that "round out the picture" is equivalent to
intentional misstatements used by the Seventh Circuit.
See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
14488 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit
stated that since a hearing was held on the existence of
factual inaccuracies in the warrant, it was not facing the
question of when an evidentiary hearing must be had where




to be applied in a situation of this nature. One test
was called the "material misstatement" test and the
court cited several cases which stood for the proposi-
tion that
when the truthfuJness of the facts underlying a warrant
has become suspect, the warrant will be set aside and
the evidence derived from it suppressed where there is
a showing that the affiant has made a material and
knowing misstatement in the affidavit.
45
The other test was taken from the often cited
Kipperman analysis" which said among other
things that misstatements in affidavits must be set
aside if negligent and material. Since the court found
that misstatement immaterial and at most negligent,
the affidavit survived both tests. Thus, while the
court recognized the validity of the two standards, it
refused to choose between them in this given case.47
However, an interesting point about the Gonzalez
case is that it is the only case wherein any circuit has
stated the possible existence of negligence in its fact
situation. Although the court states that immaterial
negligence will not invalidate an affidavit, it leaves
open the question of material negligence and implic-
ity states that negligence is an issue which it will
distinguish from nonintentional falsifications.
It is important to look at what the Second Circuit
41Id. at 835. The court relies on United States v.
Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322
(10th Cir. 1972); and United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507
(7th Cir. 1967).
'4Kipperman, supra note 3.47However, the Gonzalez court did note that prior
case law in the Second Circuit did speak on this issue,
even if only in passing.
In United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 223-224
(2d Cir. 1966), the court appeared to say that a neg-
ligent misstatement would upset a warrant only if that
misstatement was material. In United States v. Perry,
380 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 943 . . . (1967), the court stated that it is
sufficient support for a warrant that " . . . the
facts alleged by the informant, if true, establish
illegality and the affiant-agent has reasonable grounds
for believing in the truth of the allegations." In
United States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713, 716 (2d Cir.
1967), the court stated in dicta that "[it may be
that testimony at trial could so clearly demolish
statements in an affidavit supporting a warrant
that a prior denial of a motion to suppress would
be overruled." In United States v. Sultan, 463 F.2d
1066, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972), the court suggested
that a material and knowing misstatement would
upset a warrant.
United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 837-38 (2d Cir.
1973).
considers negligence. In the Gonzalez case, the
affiant alleged that Gonzalez was arrested 18 while in
possession of a safe deposit box key. At the hearing to
suppress, the affiant stated that when he took this key
from defendant, he was not certain that it was a safe
deposit box key, but upon determing that Gonzalez
had a safe deposit box, affiant applied for the search
warrant after Gonzalez's arrest without first check-
ing whether the key he obtained from Gonzalez
actually did fit that particular safe deposit box. Thus,
when the affiant applied for the warrant, he did not
actually know that the key did fit the box. As it turned
out, the key did not fit the box which was searched. 4 9
As stated previously, the Sixth Circuit designated
that one of the circumstances where the affidavit
should be held invalid is if the statement is false and
reckless. Their standard for reckless included that the
statement sought to be attacked was false when made
and that when made the affiant did not have
reasonable grounds for believing it. In the Gonzalez
case, the statement was false when made. The critical
question would be, however, if the affiant had
reasonable grounds for believing it. If there were no
reasonable grounds, then the Sixth Circuit would
label the action recklessness, while the Second
Circuit has stated that it was at most a negligent
misrepresentation. 50 The key point to be made, there-
fore, is that different standards set up by these
various circuits could conceivably provide different
outcomes for the identical fact situation. The diffi-
culty, however, is that these different standards are
not founded upon legal interpretation, but rather
upon different ways of analyzing the facts.
Although the recent trend in the federal appellate
courts is to allow challenges in the veracity of
affidavits used for obtaining warrants, the guidelines
are still loose and problematic. The Seventh and
Eighth Circuits will allow suppression of the evi-
dence if the affidavits contained intentional misstate-
ments regardless of materiality, or if the misstate-
ment was material and recklessly made. The Fifth
Circuit will invalidate the affidavit if the falsification
was meant to deceive the court, or if it was uninten-
tionally made but material to the establishment of
probable cause. It declined in the Thomas case, how-
ever, to distinguish unintentional from innocent,
48Gonzalez was convicted on one count of conspiracy and
one count of smuggling cocaine into the United States, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952 (a) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1970).
49488 F.2d at 837-38. The court felt that Gonzalez's
use of the safe deposit box was determined by investigation
and that, therefore, there was probable cause to search the
box whether or not the key fit.511d. at 838.
negligent and reckless, although it did recognize that
different standards might be set for these various
conditions in later cases. Thus, the court left unset-
tled any useful rules for these difficult situations and
set forth a truly limited opinion.
The First Circuit emphasized the necessity to
invalidate affidavits which are immaterial and inten-
tional, but which still have an impact upon the
establishment of probable cause. The Second Circuit
felt that its case did not address the various questions
and refused to set up standards until a case presented
itself with the appropriate issues. Most recently the
Sixth Circuit has joined the five other circuits which
have faced this controversial subject and added yet
another interpretation of the requirements needed to
invalidate affidavits. It decided that deception of the
court and reckless but material misrepresentations
must invalidate the affidavits. It left open for future
decision whether reckless but immaterial and any
sort of negligence must suppress the evidence.
Although it might be coincidental, it is interesting
that none of the above six circuits interpreted its
particular fact situation as one where the affidavit
was clearly invalid. The circuits either remanded for
more evidence or affirmed the validity of the affidavit.
As it stands, a myriad of interpretations govern
when affidavits should be invalidated. Since the
standards are so unclear, the circuits could conceiva-
bly fit their facts to any standard suitable to a hold-
ing of their choice. Thus, if the Seventh Circuit
did not want to invalidate an affidavit, it could hold
that a material misstatement was negligent instead of
reckless. Or the Fifth Circuit might hold a falsifica-
tion intentional, but not meant to deceive the court,
and therefore, allow the affidavit to stand. This is not
to say that the circuits would deliberately choose
categories appropriate for their holdings. It merely
points out the importance of generating clear and
uniform requirements for establishing the different
degrees of culpability. The Sixth Circuit begins to
define its own standards when it gives the criteria
necessary for recklessness, but falls short in not
completely addressing the other degrees of culpabil-
ity. It is important to distinguish between negligence
and recklessness and also between negligence and
innocence. A consideration should be whether negli-
gence is, in fact, an unworkable factor as the Seventh
Circuit asserted.
The question of good faith is yet another issue;
how does it affect culpability and how can it be
proved? Another major conflict arises in the definition
and importance of materiality. Does a material
statement have to be essential to probable cause or
merely a material statement? When should immater-
ial misstatements invalidate affidavits? More impor-
tantly, when should material misstatements not
invalidate affidavits? It seems apparent that the time
is ripe for the Supreme Court to carefully examine
these questions and give some concrete guidelines to
the confused but important issue of veracity in
affidavits.
PRISON REFORM
The constant struggle to upgrade the general con-
ditions of confinement existing within many penal
institutions may have been mitigated as a result of a
recent decision in a United States District Court for
Alabama. The court in James v. Vallace5 held that
present conditions of confinement within the Ala-
bama penal system violate any current judicial defi-
nition of cruel and unusual punishment52 and hence-
forth ordered sweeping improvements within the
prison to bring it up to constitutional standards. The
court enumerated eleven minimum requirements to
be met, i" including reduction of overcrowding, im-
51James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.
1976), decided with Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976). The Pugh case was a consolidated class
action with James.
52The definition of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment has been subject to constant
restructuring by the courts. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas &
Whittaker, JJ.); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 353 (1910).
"5The minimal standards set forth in the MINIMMi
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR INMATES OF ALABAMA
PENAL SYSTEM can be briefly summarized as follows:
I. Overcrowding: The number of inmates in each
institution in the Alabama penal system shall
not exceed the design capacity for that in-
stitution. No new prisoners, except escapees
who have had their paroles revoked, may be
accepted until the inmate population is no
greater than the design capacity for each fa-
cility.
II. Segregation and Isolation: standards set out in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
must be followed. No prisoner may be iso-
lated or segregated without due cause which
is left to the discretion of the prison offi-
cials.
III. Classifzcation: The defendants must file a
classification plan by April 15, 1976, for all
incarcerated inmates. Such plan should include
methods for pre-release and work-release or
other community based programs.
IV. Mental Health Care: The defendants shall
identify inmates who require mental health
care and make provision for such care, includ-
ing the hiring of mental health professionals.
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provement of general living conditions, food services,
education, recreation and rehabilitation programs.
The court in its final order rejected the prison of-
ficials' defense that the lack of adequate state funding
prevents them from instituting the required changes,
and stated that any failure to comply with the mini-
mum standards will require-the court to close specific
prison facilities found to be unfit for human habili-
tation.
The legal import of the decision can be readily
appreciated by focusing upon the two major issues
discussed in the opinion. First, the court, in analyz-
V. Protection from Violence: (a) defendants must
make reasonable efforts to segregate known
violent and aggressive inmates; (b) guards shall
be present at all times; (c) only minimum cus-
tody inmates may be placed in dormitories.
VI. Living Conditions: articles for personal hygiene
must be supplied; minimum living space of 60
square feet per prisoner is required; lighting,
electricity, and heating must be adequate.
VII. Food Service: must employ food supervision
and nutrition consultants.
VIII. Correspondence and Visitation: no limitation
on length or number of letters received; com-
fortable space for visitation must be pro-
vided.
IX. Educational, Vocational, Work and Recrea-
tional Opportunities: (1) each inmate shall be
assigned a meaningful job on the basis of
the inmate's abilities and interests, and ac-
cording to institutional needs. Inmates shall
not be required or allowed to perform house-
hold or personal tasks for any person; (2) each
inmate shall have the opportunity to partici-
pate in basic educational programs; (3) each
inmate shall have the opportunity to partici-
pate in a vocational training program designed
to teach a marketable skill; (4) no inmate shall
be denied educational, vocational and work op-
portunities unless there is a clear threat to in-
stitutional security; (5) each inmate shall be
afforded the opportunity to participate in some
transitional program designed to aid in his or
her re-entry into society; (6) each institution
shall have physical educational or recreational
facilities.
X. Physical Facilities: must meet minimum
standards of the U.S. Public Health Service.
XI. Staff. minimum staffing levels for each institu-
tion must be reached to reduce racial and cul-
tural disparity between staff and inmate popu-
lation.
These standards were enacted by the Alabama legisla-
ture with the intent to maintain a suitable environment
for state prisoners. Assessing whether these standards
are either less than adequate or, in fact, more stringent than
most, will largely determine the import of this case due to
the court's strict reliance upon these standards in the instant
case. James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332-35 (M.D.
Ala. 1976).
ing the adequacy of the prison environment, held that
the physical facilities violate any current judicial
interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment. The
court, however, did not limit its holding to that
declaration but expanded its holding and concluded
that confinement absent an environment which al-
lows for positive rehabilitation is an unreasonable
restriction of prisoners' rights under the eighth
amendment.
In the second issue addressed, the court expanded
the scope of judicial involvement in the administra-
tion of prison affairs. It placed the defendant state
officials on notice to upgrade specific prison facilities,
and included a warning that failure to comply with
the minimum standards set forth in the court order
would necessitate the closing of those several facil-
ities found unfit for human confinement. The pre-
scription from the court to meet the minimum stand-
ards was not solely hortatory. Rather, the court was
willing to take affirmative action in response to non-
compliance by the prison officials-thus directly
involving the court in the internal affairs of prison
administration. 54
In the instant case, the plaintiffs in two con-
solidated class actions5 5 sought declaratory and
injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1970)
for deprivation of their eighth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights. The plaintiffs set forth two allegations
within the complaint: (1) that the defendants have
failed to protect the plaintiff class from violence on
the part of other inmates; and (2) that the defendants
have failed to provide adequate rehabilitation facili-
ties and have maintained conditions that make
rehabilitation impossible.56 The court focused its
opinion on the second allegation and held that the
4 Comment, Judicial Intervention in Prison Adminis-
tration, 9 WsIN. & MARY L. REV. 178, 179 (1967). This
article discusses the equilibrium between prison administra-
tive affairs and the scope of judicial involvement in prison
affairs. See Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 929 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961).
55In these consolidated class actions, the plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for deprivation of eighth and
fourteenth amendment rights. The actions were maintaina-
ble as class actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a),(b)(2). The
first class action, Pugh, was consolidated with the claims in
James.
5 The four principal institutions for male inmates are
overcrowded. At the time of trial the institutions contained
over 3,550 men, although they were designed to house
2,300 inmates. The effects of the overcrowding made the
dormitory living arrangements unhealthy and unsanitary.
There was often no walking space between bunks, and
sanitation and security were impossible to maintain.
1976]
unsanitary living conditions in each prison cell block,
the inadequate heating and lighting throughout the
prison and the hygienic problems relating to filth and
vermin in eating areas of the prison constitute an
inhumane living environment, making it impossible
for inmates to rehabilitate themselves. The court,
declaring these conditions a violation of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments, enunciated that the
institutional work assignments and the vocational
and educational activities being performed in such
inhumane facilities make prospects for successful
inmate rehabilitation and future integration into
society remote.
The court then addressed the need for rehabilita-
tion within the context of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, concluding that the concept of rehabilitation
was incorporated within the ambit of the eighth
amendment. 11 The court relied upon the flexibility of
the definition of cruel and unusual punishment to
reach this end result, citing Weems v. United States 5 8
for the proposition that the notion of cruel and
unusual punishment is set within the context of time;
new conditions and purposes bring new meaning to
the term. 5 9 The term accordingly moves with the
mood of society's concept of decency. "
The concept of cruel and unusual punishment
within the context of prison reform has maintained
its illusive status, yet a close scrutiny of the cases
shows a common thread in the definition. "' Declar-
5 7See note 2 supra.
58217 U.S. 349 (1910).
"9Id. at 373.
"The courts, however, have identified three general
approaches to the definition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890-91 (1963).
The first approach is to determine whether the punishment
is of such a nature as to shock the general conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness. Secondly, a punishment
may be cruel and unusual if it is greatly disproportionate to
the offense for which it is imposed. Robinson v. State of
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Thirdly, a punishment
may be cruel and unusual when, although applied in
pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, it goes beyond what is
necessary to achieve that aim. Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 370 (1910); Robinson v. California, supra at 677.
Illustrative of the changing conceptual distinctions in the
definition are: Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963);
Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.
1965); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn.
1969); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo.
1964).
"In Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971) the
common thread in cruel and unusual punishment cases was
depicted as a deprivation of basic elements of hygiene.
Further, the court stressed that caution must be exercised
so as not to jeopardize good health. Id. at 670. See also
ing a violation of the eighth amendment, the courts
have looked to a deprivation of the basic elements of
hygiene and unsafe living conditions. In Jordan v.
Fitzharris62 and Wright v. McMann 63 the courts
held that where cells were not cleaned regularly and
where the accumulation of human waste presented
an immediate health hazard such confinement con-
stituted a violation of the eighth amendment. Simi-
larly, in Hancock v. Avery, "" the court upheld a
violation of the eighth amendment where a prisoner
was denuded, deprived of soap and toilet paper and
was forced to live in an unsanitary cell.
In the 19 60's an additional aspect to the defini-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment began to
emerge. 65 Rehabilitation, treatment and care became
important variables in safeguarding basic prisoners'
rights. In Jones v. Willingham, 66 the court stated
that the federal penal system has an affirmative duty
and responsibility not only to confine those charged
to its keeping, but also to "provide for their proper
government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilita-
tion, and reformation." ' 67 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970).
Citing Jones as dispositive, the court in Long v.
Harris" held that prison officials have a duty to
provide for the proper care, treatment and rehabili-
tation not only for the petitioners involved in the
action, but also for all other inmates charged to
confinement.
Moreover, in a landmark case in the area of prison
reform, Holt v. Sarver, 69 the constitutionality of an
entire penal system became the subject of attack. .0
Eight class actions were brought by inmates of the
Arkansas Penitentiary against the State Commis-
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Woolsey v. Beto,
450 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
6257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
63387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
64301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
"5In the 19 60's the courts began to consider the aspect
of rehabilitation when looking to safeguard basic prisoner's
rights. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT (1967).
66248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965).671d. at 793.
68332 F. Supp. 262 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d
1387 (10th Cir. 1973).
69309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
7 Subsequent decisions have also challenged the con-
stitutionality of facilities within penal systems, yet none of
the holdings go beyond the Holt court's decision and ra-
tionale. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1975); Finney
v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
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sioner of Corrections and against the Board of Cor-
rections. " The petitioners alleged that the condi-
tions and practices within the prison amounted to a
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
The petitioners prayed for declaratory judgment and
for permanent injunctive relief. In the Arkansas
prison the facilities were dilapidated, contributing
to deplorable sanitary conditions. Living quarters
were inadequately heated and ventilated, and elec-
trical and lighting facilities were improperly func-
tioning. All prisoners were housed in 100-man
dormitories, affording no opportunity for privacy.
Alcohol and drugs were readily obtainable and pris-
oners were often victims of overdoses. Medical and
dental facilities were practically unavailable- to in-
mates except in emergency situations. 72
The court in Holt did not grant specific individual
relief; rather, it ordered the Commissioner to take
appropriate measures in a prompt and reasonable
fashion so that the violations of the prisoners'
constitutional rights would be remedied. When look-
ing at the physical facilities, the court declared them
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment since
they deprived inmates of a hygienically clean and safe
environment. When addressing the need for reform
in the prison, however, the court looked beyond the
violation of hygienic standards and discussed the
primary objectives of a penal institution.
Holt stressed that most penologists believe that the
primary purpose of prison confinement is to rehabili-
tate the prisoner so that he may again become a
productive individual and return to society. 73 Yet in
so stating, the court in Holt was reluctant to declare
the lack of rehabilitative efforts unconstitutional per
se under the eighth amendment. The court stopped
short of this in its holding and stated that, "a so-
ciological theory or idea may ripen into constitu-
tional law.... But this Court is not prepared to say
that such a ripening has occurred as yet, as far as
rehabilitation of convicts is concerned." " Neverthe-
less, the court did indicate that the absence of an
affirmative program of training and rehabilitation
may have constitutional significance where physical
conditions and practices exist which actually militate
against reform and rehabilitation.75 More specifi-
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides a civil remedy for
deprivation of civil rights by a person acting under the
color of law, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) vests original
jurisdiction in the federal district courts.
7 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 376-79 (E.D. Ark.
1970), alf'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
73Id.
7 Id. at 379.
75Id. Though the court in Holt did not declare the lack
cally, if the physical conditions of a penal institution
deny the possibility for rehabilitation despite posi-
tive programs for reform and rehabilitation, such
conditions are constitutionally suspect under the
eighth amendment.
The decision in James addresses the same issue of
defining constitutionally adequate conditions and
declares unconstitutional the conditions of the Ala-
bama prison which are similar factually to the condi-
tions described in Holt. The James court, as did
the court in Holt, interrelated the physical environ-
ment with rehabilitative efforts. "Not only is
it cruel and unusual punishment to confine a person
in an institution under circumstances which increase
the likelihood of future confinement, but these same
conditions defeat the goal of rehabilitation which
prison officials have set for their institutions." 76 The
court in James concluded that a violation of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment will arise if the conditions of the institution
negate rehabilitative efforts, holding that the Ala-
bama prison environment had a less than neutral ef-
fect upon an inmate even if affirmative rehabilitation
programs are present. This environment denies the
inmate the right to rehabilitation.
Though the court in James may not have intended
to meet the standards set forth in Holt, it has fulfilled
the criteria of the Holt court's qualified position on
rehabilitation. According to thq Holt decision,
physical conditions and practices that militate
against reform and rehabilitation have constitu-
tional significance and the James court has, in
analyzing the Alabama prison facilities, described
those conditions as constituting an environment
which in fact militates against all efforts for rehabili-
tation.
The potential impact is great. The James decision
declares that prisoners have a right to rehabilitation;
further, the court has fulfilled the criteria enunciated
in a keystone decision in the area of prison reform. 77
The force, then, is felt on two fronts and has the
potential impact of altering the definition of cruel
and unusual punishment in the area of prison reform
to include a right to rehabilitation for inmates.
A second point of significance in James is the scope
of involvement the court was willing to assume when
of rehabilitation in the Arkansas prison unconstitutional per
se, the court did conclude that the absence of rehabilitation
services and facilities of which the petitioners complained
remained a factor in the overall constitutional equation
before the court.




providing a remedy for the abuses within the prison
facilities. To insure the proper remedial action the
court not only issued injunctive relief but threatened
court action which would close down specific facili-
ties unless minimum standards were met. In previ-
ous decisions the courts have issued declaratory
judgments or injunctive relief and merely stated that
prison officials must upgrade prison facilities in due
course or with deliberate speed.78 Generally, the
policy of the courts has been to avoid direct interfer-
ence with the actual administrative duties of the
prison. This posture has been called the "hands
off" policy in the area of prison reform. 9 In Startti
v. Beto n the court denied an inmate's petition for
relief by a writ of mandamus which asked the re-
spondent prison authorities to cease and desist
from subjecting the inmate to cruel and unusual
punishment. The inmate was confined in an unsani-
"8Cf. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974).
"8Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1973)
(unless judicial intervention is necessary to secure constitu-
tional rights, courts will not interfere with matters of pure
internal prison management); Black v. Warden, 467 F.2d
202 (10th Cir. 1972) (basic responsibility for control and
management of penal institutions, including the discipline,
treatment and care of those confined, lies with the Attorney
General and is not subject to judicial review unless exercised
in such a manner as to constitute clear arbitrariness or
caprice on the part of prison officials); Young v. Wain-
wright, 449 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971) (classification of
inmates is a matter of prison administration and manage-
ment with which federal courts are reluctant to interfere
except in extreme circumstances); Sheffey v. Greer, 391 F.
Supp. 1094 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (only in exceptional circum-
stances will a federal court interfere with matters that in-
volve internal management of a state prison); Luparer v.
Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974) (internal man-
agement of prisons or correctional institutions is vested in
and rests with the heads of those institutions operating un-
der statutory authority, and such persons' acts in the ad-
ministration of prison discipline and overall operation of
the institution are not subject to court supervision or con-
trol; but in a case of highly unusual circumstances or a vio-
lation of constitutional rights, the courts have power and a
duty to intervene in internal affairs of a prison); Hillery v.
Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (prison
officials are given a great degree of discretion in the
administration of penal institutions); Reyes v. Hauck, 339
F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (federal courts will not
interfere with the conduct, management and disciplinary
control of jails except in extreme cases); Seale v. Manson,
326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971) (absent extreme
circumstances, a federal district court must not interfere
with internal prison management or interpose its judgment
with respect to rules and regulations on discipline and
security, but the court must not be reluctant to strike down
prison regulations if they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or
not reasonably related to the needs of penal administration).
11405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969).
tary solitary cell for nine days and given only bread
and water to eat. The court dismissed the petition on
the grounds that it dealt with matters of prison
discipline that are the sole concern of the state save in
exceptional circumstances.81 In Reyeo v. Hauch
8 2
an inmate brought a civil rights action alleging cruel
and unusual punishment due to a jail guard's re-
fusal to place his name on a doctor's medical list.
The court dismissed the cause stating that federal
courts will not interfere with the conduct, manage-
ment and disciplinary control of jails except in ex-
treme cases. Furthermore, in Woods v. Burton 83
the court concluded that despite twenty-five sani-
tary and hygienic violations of the recommended
minimum standards set forth for the operation of
jails, the petitioner's confinement in the jail did not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The court
defined the problem as legislative and not judicial in
nature. 84
Recently, however, the trend for increased court
involvement to superintend treatment or discipline
of prisoners has begun to emerge. 85 In Gates v.
Collier, 86 the court issued an injunctive order where
the conditions of the Mississippi State penitentiary
deprived inmates of basic elements of hygiene and
adeq6ate medical treatment and where adequate
protection against physical assaults and abuses by
other inmates were absent. The injunctive order
called for a federal monitor to check all phases of
prison administration and management until the
violations were remedied. Concommitantly, in
Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 87 the court of
appeals upheld the federal district court's jurisdiction
over state penitentiary facilities where the facilities
were held to violate the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment. In so holding,
the appeals court decided that the district court
could continue to appoint court monitors to super-
vise the institution's administrators until the
needed changes were met.
11d. at 859.
"5339 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
"39 Wash. App. 13, 503 P.2d 1079 (1972).
84Id. at 1082.
"5 Before the court began to increase its involvement in
the administration of internal prison management the
courts did intervene where traditional constitutional rights
of an inmate were jeopardized. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1961); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944);
Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970);
Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
aff'd, 393 U.S. 266 (1968).
86501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
87505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
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At the present time, then, the courts have begun to
move away from their hands off posture and will
intervene to a limited'extent in prison administrative
policies through the appointment of monitors in a
supervisory capacity. The James court, however,
goes one step further and states that when supervi-
sory actions cannot insure the needed changes the
court will take affirmative action and close down
facilities not meeting constitutional standards.
The James court has taken a major step in
defining the interdependency between adequate
physical facilities and the right to rehabilitation. The
court utilizes a list of minimum standards as general
guidelines to declare specific facilities unconstitu-
tional. Though the court creates a right to rehabilita-
tion by employing these standards, the question re-
mains as to what specific violations in the prison
will violate the right to rehabilitation; the court
merely uses broad language to declare the environ-
ment unconstitutional. The James court, while at-
tempting to elevate rehabilitation to a constitutional
right, does not state what violations will or will not
result in denial of an inmate's right to rehabilita-
tion. a'
Furthermore, the James court in increasing the
scope of court involvement by its threat to close down
specific facilities, fails to consider the question as to
where the displaced prisoners will go once the
facilities are shut down. Is it within the proper jur-
isdiction of a court to dictate a specific plan to be
enacted by prison administrators or should such a
plan be legislative in nature?
In conclusion, the James decision has focused
upon a fundamental problem within our penal
,institutions and has redirected our attention to one of
the original purposes of detention: prisoner reha-
bilitation. In the future, courts must be cognizant
of the delicate issues involved in prison reform so
that the goal of rehabilitation can be realized.
"8The court in James uses broad language to determine
the constitutional violations in the penal system. No
specific findings of fact are alleged which would serve as
guidelines to other courts when determining violations.
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